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 The Modern Arbitration 
Frankenstein: The Rise and Fall of the 
Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau’s Arbitration Rule 
NICK LEYH* 
I had worked hard for nearly two years, for the sole purpose of infusing life 
into an inanimate body.  For this I had deprived myself of rest and health.  I had 
desired it with an ardour that far exceeded moderation; but now that I had finished, 
the beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled my 
heart.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The above quote is Dr. Victor Frankenstein’s reaction after he resurrects a 
corpse in Mary Shelley’s classic novel Frankenstein.  Dr. Frankenstein seeks to 
reanimate a corpse to achieve a better understanding of life and ultimately conquer 
death itself.2  Yet, the reanimation goes awry, and Dr. Frankenstein abandons his 
creation, who in turn exacts revenge against its creator.3  Shelley’s tale of the at-
tempted creation of an indispensable cure that is in turn perverted into a monstrous 
harm is analogous to the modern state of forced arbitration.  To an extent, arbitration 
was once utilized as an effective alternative to litigation, aiding consenting parties 
in finding a quicker and less expensive way to resolve legal issues.  However, arbi-
tration has mutated from an alternative to a de facto replacement for litigation, at 
least in the realm of federal consumer class actions where mandatory arbitration 
provisions containing class actions waivers are ubiquitous.  Moreover, the recent 
failure4 of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) to successfully reg-
ulate these arbitration provisions resembles Dr. Frankenstein’s ill-fate at the hands 
of his own creation. 
This Comment will analyze the CFPB’s proposed rule prohibiting companies 
from including a ban on class actions within their arbitration provisions.  The 
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 1.  MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN 58 (Johanna M. Smith ed., Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press 
1992) (1818). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class-Action Suits, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/senate-vote-wall-street-regula-
tion.html. 
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CFPB’s proposed rule5 has created a political firestorm, resulting in strong opposi-
tion to the ban on class action waivers amongst both House and Senate legislators.6  
Further, the current proposed rule has already been rejected by the House, utilizing 
the Congressional Review Act, an act passed in 1996 that allows the legislature to 
“fast-track” votes on legislation with only a simple majority from both houses of 
Congress,7 to enable a vote.  The debate that surrounded the rule reflects the modern 
debate surrounding the efficacy of using arbitration provisions in consumer con-
tracts:8 Proponents of the rule view the ubiquitous use of arbitration provisions in 
consumer contracts as a way for companies to evade a courthouse and justice,9 while 
detractors of the rule insist that arbitration is a simple, cheap, and effective way for 
consumers to bring claims against companies and the CFPB’s rule effectively re-
moves this option for consumers.10 
This Comment will begin by reviewing the history of the CFPB’s rule, from 
the initial arbitration inquiry conducted by the CFPB to the current debate in the 
legislature.  Next, this Comment will detail the consequences of the rule’s recent 
failure.  Lastly, this Comment will critically examine the necessity of the proposed 
rule in the current age of ever-present arbitration provisions within consumer con-
tracts and the lasting ramifications to consumers of both passage and failure. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Origins of the Arbitration Rule 
The CFPB was born out of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) in response to the financial crisis11 in 
2008.12  Dodd-Frank outlined the powers and responsibilities of the CFPB including 
specifically granting the CFPB the capability to review and restrict pre-dispute ar-
bitration.13  Moreover, Dodd-Frank specifically instructed the CFPB to “conduct a 
study of, and . . . provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of agreements 
providing for arbitration of any future dispute.”14  The CFPB announced a public 
                                                        
 5. Pub. L. 111-203, 111th Congress, tit. X (2010). 
 6. See James Koren, House Votes to Kill New Bank Arbitration Rule in Blow to Federal Consumer 
Agency, L.A. TIMES (July 25, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-arbitration-house-vote-
20170725-story.html. 
 7. See Richard S. Beth, Disapproval of Regulations by Congress: Procedure Under the Congres-
sional Review Act (Oct.10, 2001), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/316e2dc1-fc69-43cc-979a-
dfc24d784c08.pdf. 
 8. Jean R. Starlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?,  57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1661 
(2005). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Eric J. Mogilnicki, The CFPB’s Flawed Case for Banning Class Action Waivers, LAW360 
(July 13, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/815971/the-cfpb-s-flawed-case-for-banning-class-ac-
tion-waivers. 
 11. Beginning in 2007, the subprime mortgage market bubble burst leading to an international finan-
cial crisis and the collapse of huge investment banks like Lehman Brothers, a massive government 
bailout, and stricter regulation of the financial industry through legislation and the development of reg-
ulatory agencies.  See generally THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Jan. 2011). 
 12. Pub. L. 111-203, 111th Congress, tit. X (2010). 
 13. See id. at tit. X, subtitle B. 
 14. Id. at § 1028(a). 
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inquiry examining mandatory arbitration and its efficacy for consumers on April 
24, 201215 and released its findings in March of 2015.16  The CFPB’s study found 
that of the 341 arbitration awards resolved between 2010 to 2011, arbitrators 
awarded relief to consumers on their affirmative claims in thirty-two cases for a 
total of $172,433 and granted consumers debt forbearance in forty-six cases for a 
total of $189,107.17  In contrast, out of the 244 arbitration cases brought by compa-
nies, 227 resulted in awards for the companies with the awards totaling over 
$2,800,000.18 
Following up on its arbitration field study, the CFPB issued a proposed rule on 
arbitration that would prohibit companies from banning class actions suits in their 
mandatory arbitration clauses,19 and asked for public comments to be submitted 
electronically.20  On July 10, 2016, the CFPB issued its final rule implementing the 
ban on class action waivers in arbitration provisions.21  The CFPB justified its issu-
ance of the final rule on three principles: (1) the new rule would aid consumers who 
unfairly have their right to participate in class actions and seek redress in court 
eliminated by class action waivers in arbitration clauses; (2) class action law suits 
provide consumers with a greater opportunity to obtain a remedy as opposed to ar-
bitration proceedings, as found by the CFPB’s arbitration study; and (3) the class 
action law suits also serve a regulatory function in that successful class action suits 
will force companies to change harmful and fraudulent practices.22 
B.  The Political Debate Over the Rule 
The CFPB’s arbitration rule ignited a political firestorm amongst legislators, 
lobbyists, and politicians.  The rule also faced opposition by the Comptroller of 
Currency, Keith Noreika, who issued multiple public letters asking Director 
Cordray of the CFPB to delay its issuance of the rule and provide additional data to 
support the rule.23  Noreika’s first letter stressed the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency’s (“OCC”) duty to assess the soundness and safety of the CFPB’s 
                                                        
 15. See CFPB Launches Public Inquiry into Arbitration Clauses (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.con-
sumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-public-inquiry-
into-arbitration-clauses/. 
 16. See Arbitration Study: Report to Congress Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act §1028(a) (Mar. 10, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbi-
tration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf. 
 17. See id. at 12. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Notice of Proposed Rule Making: 12 CFR Part 
1040, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/docu-
ments/CFPB_Arbitration_Agreements_Notice_of_Proposed_Rulemaking.pdf. 
 20. See New Protections Mandatory Arbitration, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/arbitration-rule/. 
 21. See 12 CFR § 1040 (2016). 
 22. See CFPB Issues Rule to Ban Companies From Using Arbitration Clauses to Deny Groups of 
People Their Day in Court, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV (July 10, 2017), https://www.consum-
erfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-ban-companies-using-arbitration-clauses-deny-
groups-people-their-day-court/. 
 23. See Keith Noreika, Letter to the Honorable Richard Corday, CONSUMERFINANCEMONITOR.COM 
(July 10, 2017), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/07/OCC-
Letter-to-CFPB-re-Arbitration-Rule-07-10-2017.pdf; see also Keith Noreika, Letter to the Honorable 
Richard Cordray, CONSUMERFINANCEMONITOR.COM (July 17, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance-
monitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/07/Noreika-letter-July-17.pdf. 
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arbitration rule on the federal banking system.24  Noreika added that arbitration is 
an effective alternative dispute resolution technique for consumers and that the 
CFPB’s rule has been criticized on the basis that it could end the practice of arbi-
tration for companies and consumers alike.25 
Director Cordray responded in his own public letter on July 12, 2017, spurning 
the OCC’s request.26  Initially, Cordray expressed surprise at the OCC’s request for 
additional data and its fear that the rule could have far-reaching consequences on 
financial institutions, since the CFPB had been researching mandatory arbitration 
for several years and had publicly been engaged in the rulemaking process for the 
current rule for two years.27  In addition, Cordray stressed the OCC’s lack of in-
volvement at any stage in the process, even after the CFPB had reached out to OCC 
staff on several occasions for input.28  Cordray concluded that the OCC had not “in 
good faith attempted to work with the Bureau to resolve concerns regarding the 
effect of the rule on the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system of the 
stability of the financial system of the United States.”29  Cordray also criticized the 
OCC’s assertion that the rule would adversely affect the U.S. banking system by 
pointing out that financial institutions have managed to survive lawsuits in the past 
and still face suits today.30  Therefore, Cordray explained, the assertion that allow-
ing class action lawsuits will somehow now jeopardize U.S. financial institutions is 
mistaken.31 
Noreika again responded in a public letter on July 17, 2017, reiterating the 
OCC’s concerns that the CFPB’s rule was overreaching.32  Noreika sought further 
data from the CFPB on its conclusions regarding arbitration on the basis that such 
transparency was necessary to issuing the rule.33  Further, Noreika restated the data 
would allow the OCC to conduct a proper safety and soundness review of the rule, 
as Noreika has specifically talked to OCC economists who said such data was es-
sential to finalizing its review of the CFPB rule.34  Noreika concluded his letter by 
advising the CFPB that delaying the rule “a few additional weeks . . . seem[s] a 
sound investment.”35 
Legislators were also quick to act in response to the CFPB’s arbitration rule.  
Congress looked to the Congressional Review Act of 1996, which granted Congress 
the right to repeal regulations and rules by a simple majority in each house and 
prohibiting the issuance of a similar rule or regulation unless explicitly authorized,36 
                                                        
 24. See Keith Noreika, Letter to the Honorable Richard Corday, CONSUMERFINANCEMONITOR.COM 
(July 10, 2017), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/07/OCC-
Letter-to-CFPB-re-Arbitration-Rule-07-10-2017.pdf. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See Richard Cordray, Letter to the Honorable Keith Noreika, CONSUMERFINANCEMONITOR.COM 
(July 12, 2017), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/07/July-
12-Director-Cordray-Letter-to-Acting-Comptroller-Noreika.pdf. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Keith Noreika, Letter to the Honorable Richard Cordray, CONSUMERFINANCEMONITOR.COM 
(July 17, 2017), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/up-
loads/sites/14/2017/07/Noreika-letter-July-17.pdf. 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See 5 U.S. Code § 801(b)(2) (1996). 
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to quash the CFPB rule.37  On July 25, 2017, the House successfully authorized a 
veto of the CFPB rule in a 231-190 vote essentially down party lines.38  For now, 
the fate of the CFPB rule is in the hands of the Senate, who have already introduced 
a bill to veto the rule as well.39  However, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 
omitted any mention of the CFPB arbitration rule or the bill to veto in his speech 
regarding the agenda for the Senate after the August recess.40  Thus, the CFPB rule 
remains in legislative limbo while each party attempts to marshal sufficient votes 
in favor of its position. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE DEBATE 
The current debate concerning the CFPB’s arbitration rule has been cast in the 
shadow of two significant financial scandals: The Wells Fargo fake account scan-
dal, where the bank was caught creating fake accounts under customers’ names in 
order to accumulate fees and issue more credit cards,41 and the Equifax data breach 
that resulted in thousands of consumers’ credit cards and credit report information 
to be accessible by hackers.42  These events placed the arbitration rule in the spot-
light as both companies implemented forced arbitration amongst the consumers di-
rectly affected by the scandal.43  With the stakes of passage or failure of the CFPB’s 
rule so high and a speculated deadline for a vote on November 16,44 the political 
debate grew more fervent as the time to a final vote drew near. 
A.  The “Big, Wet Kiss to Trial Attorneys” 
Almost immediately after the promulgation of the CFPB’s arbitration rule, con-
servative opponents voiced their strong dissatisfaction against the rule.  Jeb Hen-
sarling, Republican Congressman of the 5th District of Texas and chairman of the 
                                                        
 37. David Sherifnski, House Votes to Undo Federal Consumer Bureau’s Arbitration Rule, THE 
WASHINGTON TIMES (July 25, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jul/25/house-votes-
to-undo-consumer-financial-protection-/. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Ryan Rainey, Prospects Dim for Senate Vote on CFPB Arbitration Rule this Month, MORNING 
CONSULT (Aug. 1, 2017), https://morningconsult.com/2017/08/01/prospects-dim-senate-vote-cfpb-arbi-
tration-rule-month/. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-
years-of-harm-to-customers.html. 
 42. Sara A. O’Brien, Giant Equifax Data Breach: 143 Million People Could be Affected, CNN (Sept. 
8, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/07/technology/business/equifax-data-breach/index.html. 
 43. Kevin Freking, Dems wield Equifax, Wells Fargo in fight over arbitration, WASHINGTON POST 
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/dems-wield-equifax-wells-fargo-in-fight-
overarbitration/2017/09/27/6d24b102-a3b0-11e7b5738ec86cdfe1ed_story.html?utm_term=.78adf5.B0 
dfdb 
 44. Richard S. Beth, Disapproval of Regulations by Congress: Procedure Under the Congressional 
Review Act (Oct.10, 2001), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/316e2dc1-fc69-43cc-979a-
dfc24d784c08.pdf; see also Alan Kaplinsky, What is the Deadline for the Senate to Pass a CRA Resolu-
tion to Override the CFPB’s Arbitration Rule?, CONSUMER FINANCE MONITOR (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/tag/congressional-review-act/. 
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House Financial Services Committee,45 issued a pre-release following the rule call-
ing it a “big, wet kiss to trial attorneys.”46  Hensarling echoed some of the oft-re-
peated criticisms of the rule, arguing that the CFPB’s regulation benefits trial attor-
neys lobbying at the expense of consumers, whom Hensarling asserts are the true 
beneficiaries of the arbitration system.47  Albeit briefly, Hensarling’s short and 
pointed release laid bare the opposition’s two chief complains to the rule. First, the 
rule deprives consumers of the right to arbitrate, a more efficient dispute resolution 
system than class action litigation. Second, the proposed rule will force companies 
to abandon arbitration and increase costs directly hurting consumers.48 
Financial industry representatives and conservative opponents of the CFPB’s 
rule have staunchly defended the notion that arbitration is more efficient and re-
warding system for consumers than class actions.  Attacking the CFPB’s arbitration 
study that led to the rule, Eric Mogilnicki sees the CFPB study itself as proof of 
class action litigations’ cost to consumers.49  First, Mogilnicki observes the most 
frequent results in class actions are either settlement or the plaintiff’s withdrawal.50  
He further points out that only seventeen percent of class action settlements actually 
settle on a class basis.51  Mogilnicki further highlights that even when class actions 
are resolved in favor of the entire class, the class members often get only coupons 
or vouchers instead of actual money.52  Thus, class actions are an inferior resolution 
mechanism, as opposed to arbitration.  Additionally, in a public letter to Director 
Cordray of the CFPB, the American Bankers Association (“ABA”), the Consumer 
Bankers Association (“CBA”), and the Financial Services Roundtable (“FSR”) cri-
tiqued the rule in estimating that it would cause a “permanent surge of 6,042 addi-
tional class actions” every five years.53  With this estimated increase in class actions, 
the letter continues, consumers will be forced to foot the bill for these costly class 
action suits.54 
Opponents of the rule also prophesize that the rule could lead companies to 
abandon arbitration altogether, resulting in disastrous consequences for consumers.  
The ABA, CBA, and FSR letter argued that the increase in costs by bringing a class 
action would affect both parties.55  However, companies could seek to offset the 
rising costs of litigation by increasing costs of services and products, further harm-
ing the consumers.56  The ABA, CBA and FSR go on to argue that the practice of 
                                                        
 45. See Jeb Hensarling, Committees and Caucuses, REPRESENTATIVE JEB HENSARLING (Oct. 6, 
2017), https://hensarling.house.gov/about/committees-and-caucuses. 
 46. See Press Release, Fin. Serv. Comm., Hensarling: CFPB Rule Big, Wet Kiss to Trial Attorneys 
(May 5, 2016). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Eric J. Mogilnicki, The CFPB’s Flawed Case for Banning Class Action Waivers, LAW360 (July 
13, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/815971/the-cfpb-s-flawed-case-for-banning-class-action-
waivers. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. American Bankers Association, Consumer Bankers Association, Financial Services Roundtable, 
Comments on the Bureau’s Proposed Arbitration Rule (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.aba.com/Advo-
cacy/commentletters/Documents/joint-trades-arbitration-comment-letter.pdf. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
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arbitration itself will be abandoned if the rule passes.57  The letter foresees compa-
nies forgoing arbitration for individual claims when companies would have to face 
class actions in court and the costs of resolving claims through both court and arbi-
tration systems would be “prohibitive.”58 
Ultimately, the opponents of the CFPB’s arbitration rule rely upon the future 
consequences to consumers in order to persuade the legislature and the public to 
oppose the proposed regulation. 
B.  Revoking the “Get-Out-of-Jail Free” Card 
In a news conference held in late September of this year, Senate Minority 
Leader Chuck Schumer equated passing the bill to effectively repealing the CFPB’s 
arbitration rule to allowing companies, like Wells Fargo or Equifax, “get-out-of-jail 
free” cards.59  Thus, the continued practice of forced arbitration clauses that elimi-
nate class action litigation for consumers essentially insulates companies from ac-
countability to consumers. 
Richard Frankel posits that the oft-repeated argument that a successful passage 
of the CFPB rule will result in consumers paying more for services due to increased 
litigation costs and that companies will abandon arbitration en toto are merely rhe-
torical.60  Corporations utilizing arbitration clauses participate in litigation as well, 
and further, many of those entities have carved-out exceptions for certain claims so 
that they must be tried in court.61  Therefore, the conclusion that engaging in arbi-
tration for some claims and litigation for other claims is untenable, Frankel argues, 
is demonstrably false.62  More frightening to Frankel is the proposition that the pas-
sage of the rule would actually result in companies abandoning arbitration com-
pletely.  If so, this abandonment “would show that the industry’s preference for ar-
bitration is built on claim suppression” and that current usage of “arbitra-
tion stops consumers from bringing claims.”63 
Proponents of the rule also advanced that without a rule akin to the CFPB’s, 
there is no accountability for financial institutions in the wake of scandals such as 
Wells Fargo’s fake accounts and Equifax’s data breach.  For example, David Dayen 
highlights the recently filed case Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al 
v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to illustrate not only the hypocrisy of 
the companies but also that forced arbitration insulates companies from meaningful 
                                                        
 57. See id.; see also Eric J. Mogilnicki, The CFPB’s Flawed Case for Banning Class Action Waivers, 
LAW360 (July 13, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/815971/the-cfpb-s-flawed-case-for-banning-
class-action-waivers. 
 58. American Bankers Association, Consumer Bankers Association, Financial Services Roundtable, 
Comments on the Bureau’s Proposed Arbitration Rule (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.aba.com/Advo-
cacy/commentletters/Documents/joint-trades-arbitration-comment-letter.pdf. 
 59. Senate Democrats on Forced Arbitration (CSPAN television broadcast Sept. 27, 2017), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?434769-1/senate-democrats-hold-news-conference-forced-arbitration. 
 60. See Richard Frankel, “What We Lose in Sales, We Make Up in Volume”: The Faulty Logic of the 
Financial Services Industry’s Response to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Proposed Rule 
Prohibiting Class Action Bans in Arbitration Clauses, 48 ST. MARY’S L. J. 283, 287 (2016). 
 61. See id. at 299-300; see also Arbitration Study: Report to Congress Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §1028(a) (finding that 66.7% of credit card arbitration pro-
visions, 59.0% of checking account arbitration provisions, and 62.7% of prepaid card arbitration provi-
sions had express “Carve-outs” for small claims court actions). 
 62. See Frankel, supra note 60, at 300. 
 63. Id. at 287. 
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accountability.64  The case was filed by eighteen associations and corporations chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the CFPB rule and seeking to stay the implementa-
tion of the rule.65  Ironically, Dayen finds the fact that the representatives of the 
financial institutions have “banded together” in order to seek redress in the courts, 
defeats their argument that arbitration is more effective for participants because the 
lawsuit appears so similar to a class action.66  In essence, the plaintiffs in Chamber 
of Commerce of the United States, et al v. CFPB, utilize a system of adjudication 
resembling class action litigation in order to prevent consumers from engaging in a 
similar system against themselves.67 
C.  The Treasury Weighs In 
With the sixty-day deadline of the Congressional Review Act steadily ap-
proaching, the Treasury Department weighed in with its own analysis of the CFPB 
arbitration rule.  In an attempt to sway the debate towards repealing the CFPB’s 
arbitration rule.68  The Treasury Department’s critique reiterated several talking 
points from the opponents of the rule: The rule will actually harm consumers be-
cause companies will stop using arbitration, the rule is merely a gift to class-action 
trial attorneys, and the rule will increase costs significantly to both businesses and 
consumers.69  However, the Treasury’s report also proposed a new reason to over-
turn the CFPB’s rule, arguing that class actions lead to “blackmail settlements” 
where companies settle meritless claims to avoid the risk of potentially huge judg-
ments against them.70  The Treasury Department also proposed that companies set-
tle meritless class-action claims for “nuisance value,” or to a price below the costs 
of hiring attorneys to defend the case until it is dismissed.71  The CFPB’s failure to 
account for these “blackmail settlements” reveals the CFPB’s flawed methodology 
since these settlements “represent transfers that would reduce fairness—by impos-
ing costs on firms unrelated to violations affecting consumers—rather than enhance 
it.”72 
Judge Richard Posner espoused the blackmail settlement theory when he de-
nied class certification in Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.73  In that case, the 
plaintiff class consisted of hemophiliacs infected by HIV, and the class alleged the 
infection was a result of using the defendant drug companies’ blood solid prod-
ucts.74  The district court certified the class and the defendants responded by seeking 
                                                        
 64. See David Dayen, In New Lawsuit, Corporations Band Together to Stop Consumers from Banding 
Together, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 6, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/10/06/consumer-protection-ar-
bitration-rule-lawsuit-equifax-wells-fargo/. 
 65. See Petitioners’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2-3, Chamber of Commerce of 
the United States, et al v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, No. 3:17-cv-02670 (Sept. 29, 2017). 
 66. See David Dayen, In New Lawsuit, Corporations Band Together to Stop Consumers from Banding 
Together, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 6, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/10/06/consumer-protection-ar-
bitration-rule-lawsuit-equifax-wells-fargo/. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See generally LIMITING CONSUMER CHOICE, EXPANDING COSTLY LITIGATION: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE CFPB ARBITRATION RULE, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Oct. 23, 2017). 
 69. See id. at 1-2. 
 70. Id. at 5-6. 
 71. Id. at 6. 
 72. See id. at 7. 
 73. See Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 74. Id. at 1294. 
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mandamus with the Seventh Circuit.75  At oral arguments, the defendants raised the 
“intense pressure” to settle in order to avoid a devastating potential judgment as a 
reason to decertify the class.76  Judge Posner found defendants’ argument persua-
sive, hypothesizing that some companies can face bankruptcy based solely on one 
class action judgment against them.77  However, Posner also stated that such pres-
sures must be balanced against the potential benefits that the class action will bring 
to plaintiffs.78  In Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., Judge Posner found that the pressures 
against those companies outweighed the benefits of the class actions since the plain-
tiffs’ individual damages were worthy of separate trials (as opposed to suits where 
the plaintiffs’ damages are individually too small to rationally bring to court unless 
in a class action).79  Ultimately, and in consideration of a separate issue regarding 
judicial abuse of discretion, Judge Posner decertified the class.80 
Posner’s blackmail hypothesis in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. received criticism 
as baseless and disadvantaging plaintiffs.81  Judge Rovner’s dissent highlighted that 
Posner’s theory rested on no precedent and was merely “statistical conjecturing.”82  
Additionally, the defendants presented the argument of pressure to settle to avoid 
significant financial risk for the first time at oral arguments.83  In an Eleventh Circuit 
case, Judge Tjoflat bluntly rejected an argument similar to Posner’s.84  Judge Tjoflat 
matter-of-factly stated, “[m]ere pressure to settle is not a sufficient reason for a 
court to avoid certifying an otherwise meritorious class action suit.”85  Judge Tjoflat 
recognized that overturning certification of class actions on the basis of financial 
risk to defendant companies may create pressures on plaintiff classes to settle or 
even abandon their claims altogether.86  In retrospect, the blackmail settlement the-
ory appears to fall short when given any critical examination of the aspects of class 
action litigation and the perspective of both parties. 
IV.  THE KILLING BLOW 
At nearly 10:00 p.m. on October 24, 2017, the Senate finally brought the bill 
to repeal the CFPB’s arbitration rule to the floor for a vote.87  The vote was mostly 
down party lines, with Republican senators voting for the legislation and democrats 
voting against.88  Senator Lindsay Graham of South Carolina and Senator John Ken-
nedy of Louisiana were the only two senators who voted contrary to their party.89  
                                                        
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1299. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., at 1299. 
 80. Id. at 1304. 
 81. See id. at 1306; see also Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New 
Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 689 (2005). 
 82. See Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., at 1307. 
 83. Id. at 1306. 
 84. See Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See On the Joint Resolution (H. J. Res. 111), Vote Summary, https://www.senate.gov/legisla-
tive/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=1&vote=00249#position. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
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Both senators voted against the resolution.90  In dramatic fashion, the Senate vote 
ended in a 50-50 tie, forcing Vice President Mike Pence to cast the deciding vote in 
favor of passing the legislation to repeal the CFPB arbitration rule.91 
V.  THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE FAILURE OF THE CFPB RULE 
Though the arbitration rule faced significant opposition from the start, includ-
ing multiple executive agencies creating reports against the arbitration rule and a 
lawsuit preemptively challenging the rule, the rule’s failure to pass carries a costly 
penalty for consumers.  Ultimately, the carcass of the now defunct rule further high-
lights how modern financial institutions have perverted the practice of arbitration 
into an escape from facing consumers in court.  The consequences of the failure of 
the CFPB arbitration rule are twofold: The strengthening of the protection of cor-
porations from facing litigation and the weakening of consumers’ rights to bring 
actions at all. 
A.  The Insulation of the Consumer Industry 
The failure of the CFPB’s arbitration rule removes a key regulatory option in 
overseeing corporations’ class action litigation.  Private class action litigation has 
been shown to bring to light legal issues requiring government enforcement.92  In 
the CFPB’s report to Congress regarding the state of arbitration, the agency found 
that between 2008 and 2012, there were one-hundred and thirty-three cases where 
class action litigation and government enforcement aligned on the same issue.93  
The key statistic in the CFPB’s report was that seventy-one percent of the aligning 
cases were initiated as private class actions instead of government enforcement 
suits.94  The fact that almost three-fourths of these parallel cases were begun as class 
actions demonstrates the potency of the class action suit in illuminating consumer 
wrongdoing. 
However, the study also demonstrated the efficacy of class actions in achieving 
results on behalf of consumer plaintiffs.95  Regarding both the class action cases and 
government cases that ended in settlements of over ten million dollars, twenty-one 
cases were private class actions only, six cases were initiated by private class ac-
tions and followed by government actions, and only three were government actions 
followed by private litigation.96  Further, there were no government-initiated actions 
whatsoever that resulted in settlements of over ten million dollars.97  The settlement 
amounts also increased when private class actions commenced the lawsuits instead 
of government agencies.98  For the private class actions with no government actions 
                                                        
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, pursuant to Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 13-20 (Mar. 2015). 
 93. See id at 14. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. at 18. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, pursuant to Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, at 18-19. 
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following, the net relief (which excludes attorneys’ fees and court costs)99 totaled 
931 million dollars.100  In the government actions that trailed private class actions, 
those settlements resulted in 814 million dollars.101  However, in suits where private 
class actions followed government actions the settlements resulted in only 299 mil-
lion dollars in total net relief.102  The CFPB’s data presents a powerful case for the 
notion that class actions provide a successful regulatory function for consumers 
against consumer corporations. 
More specifically, class action litigation can verifiably lead to significant pol-
icy change within corporations.  In the case of In Re Checking Account Overdraft 
Litigation, bank account holders filed a class action, alleging their banks collected 
excessive overdraft fees related to debit card charges.103  The account holders as-
serted the banks intentionally rearranged the charges from highest to lowest to max-
imize the amount of overdraft fees.104  The case ultimately settled for 410 million 
dollars.105  Far more reaching than the massive settlement was the shift in overdraft 
fee policy across the nation.106  According to the Pew Charitable Trusts, banks dra-
matically reduced categorizing account holder transactions from highest to lowest 
in the years after the In Re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation.107  Remarkably, 
ninety one percent of the large banks have limited or abandoned “high-to-low” cat-
egorization of account holder transactions.108  In regards to tobacco class action 
litigation in the 1990s, class actions helped pave the way for the historic Master 
Settlement Agreement109 and continued to keep the tobacco industry honest in fear 
of plaintiffs “landing a killer blow.”110  While there are countless other examples of 
class action litigation directly impacting consumer industries, the CFPB’s arbitra-
tion rule ultimately removes this effective tool from the hands of the consumers. 
                                                        
 99. See id. at 23. 
 100. See id. at 19. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 104. See id. 
 105. See Timothy Raub, Judge Approves $410 Million Settlement In Checking Account Overdraft 
MDL, LEXIS NEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM (Nov. 9, 2011), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/lit-
igation/b/litigation-blog/archive/2011/11/09/judge-approves-410-million-settlement-in-checking-ac-
count-overdraft-mdl.aspx?Redirected=true. 
 106. See generally David L. Noll, The Dangerous Consequences of Repealing the CFPB’s Arbitration, 
THE REGULATORY REV. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/11/06/noll-repealing-arbi-
tration-rule/. 
 107. See Consumers Need Protection From Excessive Overdraft Costs: An Evidence-Based Case for 
Regulation to Limit the Number and Amount of Fees, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Dec. 20, 2016), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/12/consumers-need-protection-
from-excessive-overdraft-costs. 
 108. See id. 
 109. The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement was a settlement between forty-six U.S. states and 
four tobacco manufacturing companies in 1998. The settlement resulted in the tobacco companies paying 
over 206 billion dollars. See Master Settlement Agreement, (Nov. 1998) https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20080625084126/http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-
pdf/1109185724_1032468605_cigmsa.pdf. 
 110. GERAINT HOWELLS, THE TOBACCO CHALLENGE: LEGAL POLICY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
150 (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013). 
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B.  “Too Darn Bad” For Consumers 
After the repeal of the CFPB’s arbitration rule, consumers’ ability to hold com-
panies accountable for wrongdoing has been crippled.  Professor David Noll ob-
serves the options for consumers has not only been limited but those options have 
become more indirect as well.111  Noll explains that private lawyers will hesitate to 
take future consumer-related litigation because individually, they won’t be cost-
effective to pursue, and as a class-action they are now likely barred unless explicitly 
authorized by other legislation.112  Thus, a consumer desiring to hold a multimillion 
dollar corporation accountable will have to rely upon state law enforcement and 
administrative agencies to bring potential claims.113  However, not only are prose-
cutors and administrative officials resource-limited, their “decisions about which 
cases to pursue are influenced by political considerations that do not affect private 
attorneys.”114  Noll muses that only “[t]ime will tell whether [the repeal of the arbi-
tration rule] merely opened the door to a new era of corporate fraud.”115 
While consumers’ options may have drastically decreased, businesses are using 
arbitration provisions exponentially more to evade changing problematic practices 
and policies.  In Amador, et. al. v. California Culinary Academy, Inc., et. al.,116 a 
class of students brought an action against Career Education Corporation (“CEC”) 
and California Culinary Academy, a subsidiary of CEC.117  The students alleged 
CEC fraudulently misrepresented the program, the incomes students working culi-
nary jobs who attended CEC programs earned, as well as the qualifications CEC 
required for incoming students.118  The class action ultimately settled, netting the 
students forty million dollars.119  Sometime after this settlement, CEC began imple-
menting binding arbitration provisions preventing students from bringing further 
class actions.120  Instead of forcing CEC to alter its policies regarding its advertising 
towards prospective students, mandatory arbitration provisions provided CEC with 
a sufficient alternative to real change. 
The Education Department proposed new regulations last year that prohibited 
“mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses and class action waivers that deny stu-
dents their day in court if they are wronged.”121  However, the proposed regulations 
face a similar fate to the CFPB’s arbitration rule since, as the new administration 
                                                        
 111. See David L. Noll, The Dangerous Consequences of Repealing the CFPB’s Arbitration, THE 
REGULATORY REVIEW (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/11/06/noll-repealing-arbi-
tration-rule/. 
 112. See id. 
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07 467710 (Cal. 2007). 
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and Secretary of Education took office, Secretary Betsy Devos has announced a 
“regulatory reset” that includes establishing a new rule making committee to poten-
tially revise the proposed regulation.122  Further, the proposed regulations have been 
delayed to take effect in July of 2019—two years after the proposed regulation was 
slated to be enforced.123 
Forced arbitration provisions prohibiting class action litigation severely re-
stricts consumers’ ability to hold corporations accountable for their transgressions.  
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, where the Supreme Court 
upheld arbitration provisions prohibiting class actions, Justice Kagan writing for the 
dissent believed the majority merely told consumers “[t]oo darn bad” when facing 
forced arbitration.124  In repealing the CFPB’s arbitration rule, Congress has echoed 
this sentiment emphatically. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Had I right, for my own benefit, to inflict this curse upon everlasting genera-
tions?  I had before been moved by the sophisms of the being I had created; I had 
been struck senseless by his fiendish threats; but now, for the first time, the wicked-
ness of my promise burst upon me; I shuddered to think that future ages might curse 
me as their pest, whose selfishness had not hesitated to buy its own peace at the 
price, perhaps, of the existence of the whole human race.125 
 
When Dr. Frankenstein ponders on the permanency of his failed experiment on 
society, he despairs at the thought of the continued existence and propagation of his 
creation.126  One wonders whether the current state of forced arbitration excluding 
class action litigation will be viewed with similar disgust in the future.  Regardless 
of its perception in the years to come, mandatory arbitration is here to stay for the 
time being.  The CFPB’s attempt and subsequent failure to reign in mandatory ar-
bitration signals the vitality of the current practice of forcing consumers to choose 
between a service or the right to a lawsuit.  After Dr. Frankenstein dies, his creation 
expresses his regret over Dr. Frankenstein’s inability to foresee the consequences 
of his actions: “and if yet, in some mode unknown to me, thou hadst not ceased to 
think and feel, thou wouldst not desire against me a vengeance greater than that 
which I feel.”127  As consumers continue to endure the ramifications of mandatory 
arbitration provisions and class actions waivers, Congress may have wished to have 
“thought and felt” before repealing necessary regulation to protect consumers such 
as the CFPB’s proposed regulation. 
                                                        
 122. See Secretary DeVos Announces Regulatory Reset to Protect Students, Taxpayers, Higher Ed In-
stitutions, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (June 14, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-re-
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